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 ABSTRACT 
Our society is fascinated with risk in many different areas and disciplines. One of the main ways 
to describe and communicate the level of risk is through risk indices, which summarize risk 
using numbers or categories such as words, letters, or colors. These indices are used to 
communicate risks to the public, understand how risk is changing over time, compare among 
different risks, and support decision making. Given the different methods to construct risk 
indices, including flawed methods such as risk matrices, this paper develops specific steps that 
analysts can follow to create a risk index. This paper emphasizes the importance of describing 
risk with a probability distribution, developing a numerical risk measure that summarizes the 
probability distribution, and finally translating the risk measure to an index. Measuring the risk is 
the most difficult part and requires the analyst to summarize a probability distribution into one or 
possibly a few numbers. The risk measure can then be transformed to a numerical or categorical 
index. We apply the method outlined in this paper to construct a risk index that compares the risk 
of fatalities in aviation and highway transportation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Our society is preoccupied with the subject of risk. From financial risk to the risk of a 
terrorist attack to the risk of disease, individuals want to understand how a disastrous event may 
affect them and how they can avoid it. With so many different types of risks present in modern 
society, risk indices have increasingly become an important way to communicate the seriousness 
of a risk. A search for the term “risk index” in Google Scholar returns 980 results for the year 
2001 compared to 4,460 results for the year 2011 even though a search for the term “risk” returns 
more than three times as many results for 2001 as for 2011. It would appear that risk indices are 
outpacing the risks that they measure. The increasing popularity of risk indices demands a 
careful study of risk indices and the best ways to construct a risk index. 
Three well-known examples of risk indices, which summarize risk via a number or 
category, demonstrate their wide variety. The American Society of Civil Engineers
(1)
 uses a letter 
grade to rate the quality of U.S. infrastructure (where the letter grades explain the vulnerability 
or risk of failure of infrastructure); value at risk is a single number that describes how much a 
portfolio could lose at a specified probability level; and the now-defunct Homeland Security 
Advisory System used a color and word categorization to describe the national security threat 
level. First, each index summarizes risk differently: one uses letters, another uses real numbers, 
and the third uses colors with word descriptors. Second, each risk index covers a different 
discipline: engineering, financial, and security. Third, the purposes of the indices vary: the letter 
grades are used to motivate investment and attention on U.S. infrastructure, an investment firm 
usually calculates value at risk for its own internal benefit, and the Homeland Security Advisory 
System was designed to communicate the risk of terrorism to an entire nation.  
As these three examples show, risk indices can have varied purposes. A risk index 
usually attempts to fulfill at least one of the following objectives.  
 Describe the risk of an event accurately 
 Communicate the level of risk 
 Compare among different risks 
 Identify the most serious risk  
 Translate how risk changes over time 
 Measure the effectiveness of risk-reduction strategies 
 Recommend actions for a given level of risk 
Despite the different goals, audiences, and means of constructing risk indices, this paper offers 
recommendations to aid in the construction of a risk index for any discipline. The specific goals 
and intended audience of a risk index should determine the final form of the index. Because risk 
indices summarize risks into a single or possibly two or three metrics, careful decision making 
where risk is present should eschew the index in favor of a more complete description of risk. As 
Cox
(2)
 demonstrates, selecting among different risk reduction strategies should rely on both the 
cost and effectiveness of each strategy.   
 This paper seeks to assist practitioners who want to construct a risk index by outlining 
issues that should be considered and suggesting concrete steps to construct an index. In order to 
accomplish that task, the paper makes the following contributions. First, the paper defines a risk 
index and distinguishes it from a risk measure (Section 2), which to our knowledge has not been 
done in the literature. Clearly defining and distinguishing between these terms is necessary to 
help analysts and practitioners who are measuring and communicating risk. Second, Section 3 
outlines the different choices for a numerical risk measure, discusses advantages and 
disadvantages of each type of risk measure, and encourages using measures composed of 
multiple numbers rather than resorting to a single number. Third, the paper describes options for 
translating a numerical measure to either a numerical or categorical risk index but emphasizes 
that even categorical indices should be based on sound numerical analysis (Section 4). Fourth, 
the guidelines are applied to an illustrative example in Section 5 focusing on the risk of 
transportation, and this example demonstrates how the selection of a risk measure and the type of 
index impacts the interpretation and perception of risks. Finally, the conclusion details how the 
above objectives can help determine the most appropriate type of risk index. 
 
2. STEPS TO CREATE A RISK INDEX 
 The term risk index is frequently used but rarely defined. In economics, where the subject 
of indices has been explored both theoretically and practically, indices are “statistical summaries 
used to compare different situations, times, conditions, or objects.”(3) Similarly, a risk index 
summarizes the risk of an event or situation by using numbers or categorical values for the 
purpose of identifying and comparing risks. Summarizing information appeals to all of us who 
want to feel informed but do not have time to fully digest the entirety of the information. 
 Two of the most popular ways to summarize the risk of an event into an index form 
include color-coded risk matrices and additive scoring methods, and people seem to gravitate to 
these methods because they appear objective and are relatively easy to understand and 
implement.
(4,5)
 These methods do not account for uncertainty in a mathematically rigorous 
manner, rely on ambiguous meanings of words such as “very frequent” and “high impact,” and 
create unintended consequences based on arbitrary scoring and ranking systems.
(6)
 By 
developing concrete steps based on principles of decision and risk analysis, this paper strives to 
move people away from methods like risk matrices and additive scoring methods when creating 
risk indices.  
To start, one must understand the most complete way to describe the risk of an event. In 
the tradition of probabilistic risk analysis, risk is best defined as a combination of the probability 
of an unwanted event occurring and the severity or consequences if that event occurs.
(6,7)
 Fully 
describing risk involves calculating a probability distribution over the range of possible 
consequences for an event. A risk index is a summary of the probability distribution over the 
range of possible consequences. Other factors, such as the voluntariness, controllability, dread, 
and familiarity of the risk, also influence people’s perception of risk.(8) Although a risk analyst 
may incorporate the public’s reactions to a disruption within his or her consequence assessment, 
risk analysis and risk communication generally should seek to quantify and explain the risk and 
either instruct people about how to handle or mitigate the risk or empower them to make their 
own decisions.
(9)
 Because this paper assumes the risk index is normative with the goal of 
accurately informing people about the size of a risk, measuring a risk based on these other 
factors departs from that goal.  
 The terms risk measure and risk index are often used synonymously, and both attempt to 
summarize risk through a single value. This paper makes an important distinction between the 
two. A risk measure is a numerical summary of risk, and that number is a real number. As will be 
discussed later, we also allow the measure to be a vector of real numbers. A risk index can also 
be a real number or a vector of real numbers, but it is often composed of ordinal numbers, letters, 
words, or colors, thus widening the means of communicating risk to the user. We view risk 
measures to be a subset of risk indices. 
To construct a risk index, an analyst should first develop a probability distribution over 
the range of consequences that fully describe the risk of an event, investment, or project. Next, 
the analyst should calculate a numerical measure that accurately summarizes the probability 
distribution. Finally, the risk measure can be translated to a different scale (like a color or ordinal 
number) to communicate the risk to a larger audience. Choosing a risk measure and translating 
the measure to a numerical or categorical scale require subjective judgments by the analyst or 
decision maker. Many experts
(10,11,12,13)
 have described how to conduct probabilistic risk 
analysis, and this paper assumes that the analyst is able to assess a probability distribution over 
the consequences. The distribution could be based on data and rely on a frequentist interpretation 
of probability, be based on expert elicitation and a subjective Bayesian interpretation, or combine 
these two views of probability. Given the assumption of a probability distribution over the range 
of consequences, this paper focuses on the last two steps of developing a risk index. The next 
section discusses and comments on some of the commonly used approaches for calculating a risk 
measure. 
 
3. CHOICES FOR RISK MEASURES  
 Actuarial science and financial mathematics researchers have extensively studied and 
evaluated several types of risk measures. Financial risk measures are often interpreted as the 
amount of capital to be held in reserve for a risky portfolio or investment. Much of the 
literature
(14,15,16)
 lists desirable axioms or properties for financial risk measures that encourage 
desirable investor behavior, and risk measures are evaluated against those axioms. This 
axiomatic approach to financial risk measurement have led to several risk measures that serve as 
useful quantitative tools for making decisions about investments and calculating insurance 
premiums.
(17,18,19)
 Unfortunately, that same type of sophistication has generally not been 
translated to risk measures outside of investment science. When the properties of more general 
risk measures have been explored, the risk measures are often developed in order to describe 
how people naturally perceive risk.
(20,21,22,23)
   
Because an important step to constructing a risk index is the accurate measurement of 
risk, we seek to explore the choice of risk measures from a practical viewpoint that can apply to 
a wide variety of areas in order to help inform and education people about risk. This brief survey 
of risk measures is not exhaustive, but it should help risk analysts and risk managers in areas 
where users want to see risk measures and indices to think more systematically about how to 
choose a risk measure as a foundation for the index. Some of the more well-known financial risk 
measures are discussed in order to illustrate how ideas from financial risk could be applied to 
other areas, but a rich literature already exists explaining the merits and drawbacks of various 
financial risk measures (see e.g., Albrecht
(24)
 and Dowd and Blake
(25)
). 
The different types of risk measures in use today can be classified into four general 
categories: moments of a probability distribution, quantiles of a distribution, disutility functions, 
and combined factors. Each of these risk measures has positive and negative aspects. A risk 
measure is often a single number, such as the mean or a quantile, but a risk measure can also be 
comprised of multiple numbers (or a vector of numbers), such as the first two moments of a 
distribution or three different quantiles. We first survey single-number risk measures based on 
the four general categories before discussing the benefits and drawbacks of using multiple-
number measures. 
This paper uses a random variable   to represent the consequences of an event whose 
risk we are interested in measuring.     implies negative or adverse consequences (e.g., 
money lost on an investment, deaths resulting from an event);     implies positive 
consequences; and       indicates that    has worse consequences than   . 
 3.1. Moments of a Distribution 
 Statistical moments are one of the most popular ways to summarize a probability 
distribution, and they can serve as good measures of risk. The mean value is used frequently, and 
the risk of an event may be stated as the mean, expected value, or expected loss.
(2,26,27)
 Standard 
deviation can also serve as a measure of risk, especially in finance, and more variation generally 
means more risk. Relying on just one of these measures can ignore important information, 
however. The mean fails to convey information about the spread of the distribution, and only 
relying on standard deviation as a risk measure is problematic because it gives no indication of 
the central tendency. Using standard deviation as a measure of risk could lead to situations where 
a decision maker prefers a certain outcome of no gain or loss to a highly variable situation where 
only positive outcomes are possible.
(28)
 The mean and standard deviation may also fail to capture 
information about other properties in a distribution such as the number of modes or the 
broadness of the tails. Higher-order moments, such as skewness or kurtosis, can be used to model 
the rate of tail decay, but estimating these moments from data is highly sensitive to the sample. 
For heavy-tailed distributions whose higher-order moments may be infinite (e.g., the Pareto 
distribution), the tail index (see Beirlant et al.
(29)
) can better measure the rate of tail decay. 
A risk measure may combine the mean and standard deviation or variance into a single 
number in order to incorporate both the location and spread of the probability distribution. The 
mean-variance theory developed by Markowitz
(30)
 argues that both metrics are important: 
investment portfolios should be selected to maximize the expected return and minimize variance. 
In insurance, the standard deviation principle defines the risk premium as the expected amount to 
pay in claims plus a constant term multiplied by the variance or standard deviation.
(17,31,32)
 The 
expected number of fatalities plus the product of a risk aversion parameter and the standard 
deviation of fatalities has also been proposed has a measure to determine if a risk is socially 
acceptable.
(33)
 A measure combining the first two moments  ( ) is presented in Eq. (1) as a 
weighted sum of the mean  ( ) and standard deviation  ( ) where   is a risk aversion 
parameter. Because the risk measure is a function of the negative of the mean, the measure 
increases as consequences worsen. (Recall that     implies negative consequences and     
indicates positive consequences.) 
 ( )     ( )    ( ) (1) 
Risk neutrality implies    , and risk aversion implies that    . The   parameter can be 
tailored to reflect an individual’s willingness to trade off between the mean and the standard 
deviation.  
 Identifying a single probability distribution that describes the range of potential 
consequences can be very difficult. Even an extensive risk analysis may be unable to choose 
among multiple probability distributions, especially if different scenarios or “states of the world” 
are possible where each scenario generates a different distribution. Each distribution can 
generate a different mean and standard deviation. A risk measure could be a weighted sum of the 
expected value according to the most likely distribution (i.e., the most probable scenario) and the 
smallest expected value from all possible distributions.
(34)
 Eq. (2) depicts this risk measure 
designed to deal with uncertainty in the probability distributions, where    ( ) is the most 
likely expected value,     ( ) is the worst-case expected value, and   [   ] is the analyst’s or 
decision maker’s degree of confidence in the most likely distribution. 
 ( )        ( )  (   )    ( ) (2) 
Alternatively, a hierarchical model could assess a probability distribution over the range of 
possible scenarios and a risk measure, such as the expected value, can be calculated using the 
probability of each scenario.  
 
3.2. Quantiles of a Distribution 
 Risk analysis often focuses on extreme or high-consequence events. If these extreme 
events occur infrequently or have a small probability of occurring, quantiles can be a useful tool 
to measure these risks. The q-quantile of a distribution,   (   ), is the largest value    
(technically, the supremum) such that the probability that the consequences are worse than    is 
less than or equal to  , or    {    (    )   }.
(35)
 Perhaps the best example of using a 
quantile as a risk measure is value at risk. With origins dating to the early twentieth century but 
popularized in the 1990s, value at risk can be defined as the minimum amount of capital that 
would need to be added to a risky investment such that the probability of loss does not exceed a 
specified probability  .(36) The functional form is     ( )      where    is the q-quantile. 
For example, if        ( )       , there is a 5% chance that a portfolio will lose at least 
$1000, or alternatively, if $1000 is added to the value of the portfolio, there is a 5% chance the 
portfolio will lose money. The value-at-risk measure does not, however, describe the maximum 
possible loss or take into account losses that exceed value at risk (Figure 1). Because the value at 
risk of a weighted sum of two investments   and  ,      (   (   ) ) where   [   ], is 
in general not less than or equal to the weighted sum of each value-at-risk measure, 
     ( )  (   )    ( ), this measure does not encourage diversification of risky 
investments, which is a desirable characteristic of financial risk measures.
(14,36)
 One solution to 
these limitations of value at risk is to use the weighted averages of the quantiles for different 
values of q as a risk measure.
(16)
  
 Fig. 1. Two portfolios have identical values at risk at       :             but the probability of very extreme 
losses (e.g., less than -20)  is larger for portfolio 2 than portfolio 1. 
 
One example of using weighted averages of the different quantiles is conditional value at 
risk. Conditional value at risk calculates the expected value given that losses exceed or are equal 
to value at risk, and it better captures the extreme tails and encourages portfolio 
diversification.
(35,36) 
Although conditional value at risk was introduced and remains most popular 
as a financial risk measure, it has also been proposed to measure the risk of transporting 
hazardous materials,
(37)
 industrial production under uncertain demand,
(38)
 and wait times at 
hospitals.
(39)
 This measure has been suggested as a useful tool for analyzing engineering risk as 
part of the partitioned multiobjective risk method which seeks to find Pareto optimal sets of 
alternatives based on different measures of risk.
(13,40)
 
 Although measures based on a quantile of a distribution can describe the risk of low 
probability, high-consequence events to a greater degree than mean or variance, they do not 
account for risks that are less extreme than the chosen quantile. Two distributions could be 
identical for all values less than the value corresponding to   but differ for less extreme values, 
and a risk measure based on quantiles would be the same for these two distributions. Losses that 
do not exceed value at risk may be of relatively little concern in finance and insurance because 
an organization will likely have enough money to cover these smaller losses. However, less 
extreme consequences may be important to consider for when making decisions about non-
monetary risks. For example, military generals preparing for war may want to measure the risk 
of fatalities due to war, and a risk measure that fails to distinguish between fatalities less extreme 
than the 5% quantile may judge two strategies to be equally risky even though one strategy may 
lead to more fatalities at the 10%, 20%, and 50% quantiles. Using a quantile as a risk measure 
seems most suitable if it is used in concert with a measure representing the average or median 
risk—as an investor might do by maximizing the expected return of a portfolio subject to a 
value-at-risk constraint
(41)—or if the analyst is primarily concerned with low-probability, high-
consequence events and can ignore less extreme risk scenarios.  
 
3.3. Disutility Functions 
Because utility functions provide a solid foundation for making decisions under 
uncertainty, measuring risk with utility functions is a natural extension.
(42,43)
 In insurance, the 
zero-utility premium is a risk measure that describes the premium an individual or organization 
requires in order to insure a risky event. The expected utility of the premium and the uncertain 
risky event equals the utility without either the premium or event. Eq. (3) depicts two 
mathematical expressions for the zero-utility premium, depending on whether or not initial 
wealth is included, where   is the initial wealth and  ( ) is the utility function.(17,18) 
 [ (   ( )   )]   ( ) or  [ ( ( )   )]    (3) 
The risk measure  ( ) is the premium necessary to make an individual indifferent between 
insuring the risk and not insuring the risk.  
Applying the zero-utility premium to non-monetary risks may pose difficulties because 
calculating a monetary risk premium requires assessing a tradeoff between money and potential 
consequences. Another utility-based risk measure uses disutility or loss functions. Disutility 
functions  ( ) are the opposite of utility functions and describe the disutility an individual feels 
due to negative consequences. Mathematically,  ( )    ( ), and  ( ) increases as   
decreases (i.e., as the consequences worsen). Similar to how expected utility can be deployed to 
choose between two alternatives, expected disutility, as given in Eq. (4), can serve as measure of 
risk, where   ( ) is a probability density function over the potential outcomes.  




If the risk measure is designed to only capture potential losses (downside risk), the upper limit of 
integration should be zero instead of positive infinity.  
In actuarial science, disutility functions are typically called loss functions or utility-based 
shortfall risk if the loss function is convex with respect to  .(44) Utility-based shortfall risk 
measures provide a consistent measure of risk over time
(44)
 and may be more sensitive to extreme 
risks and large losses than quantile-based measures.
(36)
 Föllmer and Schied
(15,45)
 use a loss 
function to calculate the amount of capital necessary for an investor to accept a risky position   
and extend the concept to develop robust risk measures for multiple scenarios. 
Although many different disutility functions may be appropriate, this paper will focus on 
exponential disutility and the α-t model. The exponential disutility function is given in Eq. (5) 
where   reflects an individual’s tolerance for risk. 
If risk averse,   ( )        ,  γ > 0 
If risk neutral,  ( )                                                         (5) 
If risk seeking,  ( )        ,  γ < 0  
All of these functions are positive when    , and the disutility function equals 0 if    .  
Another possible disutility function defines risk as a failure to meet a target outcome or 
objective. Fishburn
(46)
 generalized this viewpoint in the α-t model, which is defined in Eq. (6) 
where   is a fixed upper bound so that only consequences below this upper bound are included in 
the risk measure, and   characterizes the risk attitude. 




The parameter     implies risk seeking,     implies risk neutrality, and     implies risk 
aversion. A typical value for   is 0, which indicates that only outcomes where     will be 
included in the risk measure.  
 Both the exponential disutility and the α-t model can be transformed so that the units of 
the risk measure are in the same units as the consequences x. This can be accomplished by taking 
the inverse function of the disutility function: for exponential disutility,    ( ( )) where 
   ( ) is the inverse function of Eq. (3) and    ( )  ⁄  for the α-t model. In insurance, the 
measure resulting from the inverse of expected disutility or loss is known as the mean value 
principle and enables the risk measure or premium to be expressed in monetary units.
(17)
 
 Estimating the risk attitude parameter poses the most difficult obstacle for using a risk 
measure based on disutility. If multiple individuals are going to use the risk measure, as is 
usually the case, determining a single risk attitude parameter that can be used for the entire group 
may be impossible. Even if everybody’s risk attitude could be assessed, individuals have 
different tolerances for risk,
(47,48)
 and one measure will likely not accurately reflect each 
individual’s attitude toward risk.  
 
3.4. Functions of Indicators or Factors 
 The fourth category of risk measures are those based on factors or indicators which are 
aggregated together. Several factors that are related to the risk of the event are aggregated 
together, often through a weighted linear combination of the factors.
(49)
 Some risk measures or 









   
 One reason indices or measures based on aggregating different factors are popular is 
because these factors or indicators can often be measured or easily assessed from experts. When 
data are available, regression can be deployed to calculate the weighting parameters. 
Aggregating these factors through a functional form makes the measure appear objective, and the 
challenging task of estimating a probability distribution is usually not necessary.   
As deterministic functions, these measures frequently fail to account for the uncertainty 
that is inherent in risk. Even when they incorporate uncertainty, they treat uncertainty or the 
frequency of the event as another indicator or factor rather than using a true probability 
distribution. For example, the WorldRiskIndex,
(54)
 which has been developed to inform 
communities around the world about the risk of natural disasters, has four components: exposure, 
susceptibility, coping capacities, and adaptive capacities. Each component is expressed as a 
percentage between 0 and 100 percent, and exposure attempts to measures the percentage of the 
citizens in a country exposed to a natural disaster. An overall level of risk for a country is the 
product of the exposure indicator and a weighted sum of the percentages of the other three 
components. Although exposure can be interpreted as the probability of a natural disaster 
impacting a random individual in a specified nation, none of the indicators quantify uncertainty 
in the consequences from a natural disaster. Multiplying exposure by the other indicators that are 
themselves weighted sums of other sub-categories has no true probabilistic meaning.  
As another example of basing a risk measure on factors, failure mode and effect analysis 
is a risk analysis method used by industry to identify points of failure in a process or system. The 
risk measure, called the risk priority number, is the product of three factors: the frequency of a 
problem, the likelihood the problem will not be detected, and the severity of the problem. Each 
factor is measured on a ten-point ordinal scale without any translation to probabilities or 




3.5. Risk Measures of More Than One Number 
 The risk measures thus far examined are measures composed of a single number. Even 
the measure in Eq. (1) based on two statistical moments (the mean and standard deviation) 
results in a single number. Instead of summarizing risk as a single number, a risk measure could 
be composed of two or three summary numbers, which conveys more information than a single 
number. A risk measure based on the moments of the distribution can include both the mean and 
standard deviation of the probability distribution. Investment science has traditionally used 
mean-variance analysis to evaluate and compare different investments. This measure conveys 
both the location and the spread of the distribution, and the closer the distribution is to a normal 
distribution, the more the mean and standard deviation fully describe the distribution. 
In order to emphasize low-probability events without ignoring more likely scenarios, a 
three-number measure may be composed of different quantiles, like the 0.05, 0.50, and 0.95 
quantiles. Such a description could communicate a fairly accurate picture of the probability 
distribution, and users could compare the risks of two different events on a quantile-by-quantile 
basis.
(57)
 As mentioned earlier, the expected return of an investment portfolio and value at risk 
for that portfolio can be used to select the mix of assets for that portfolio.
(41)
 Jouini et al.
(58)
 
extend a class of popular financial risk measures, which includes conditional value at risk, to a 
multidimensional framework.  
Because the major difficulty with a disutility-based measure is determining a risk attitude 
parameter appropriate for several individuals, a risk measure could be composed of multiple 
values, each of which corresponds to a different risk attitude. For example, one number could be 
expected disutility for a moderately risk seeking person, another number for a risk neutral 
person, and the final number for a moderately risk averse person. A person using this risk 
measure could use the measure that best corresponds to his or her risk preference.  
 One difficulty with using a risk measure composed of multiple numbers is that the 
measure does not instruct a user how to rank or compare risks. For example, if a risk measure is 
composed of the mean and standard deviation, anyone using the measure must still decide 
whether the mean or standard deviation is more important. If the measure should determine that 
one event carries more risk by weighting the importance of the standard deviation vis-à-vis the 
mean, the risk measure in Eq. (1) provides an appropriate option. Alternatively, an analyst could 
present the two- or three-number risk measure and realize that different people will make 
different conclusions about the riskiness of the event based on their own beliefs. 
Despite the ability to communicate more information with multiple values, most risk 
measures appear to be single number. It is unclear as to why a single-number measure might be 
preferred: because analysts prefer to summarize their research into a single number or because 
users of these measures want to interpret a single value. Risk analysts should use risk measures 
composed of multiple numbers more frequently than currently appears to be the case because 
these measures may better accomplish the purpose behind analyzing and communicating the risk.  
 
4. FROM A RISK MEASURE TO A RISK INDEX 
After choosing a risk measure, the analyst may want to transform the measure to a risk 
index. As this paper has defined a measure and index, a risk measure can be considered a risk 
index without any further calculations or operations. Because financial risk measures are usually 
in monetary units, rescaling these measures is usually unnecessary. Transforming the scale of 
non-financial risk measures may help facilitate understanding, especially for measures that are 
functions of indicators and factors because these functions often do not have any units like 
number of fatalities. Even a measure with real-world units may be difficult to interpret. For 
example, an expected value measure such as 220,000 barrels of oil might be difficult to interpret 
without context about the geographic area or the maximum number of barrels. If that measure is 
transformed to a number such as 80 on a scale from 0 to 100, it may be easier to understand that 
the number represents a serious risk. If a measure is a vector of numbers, each number in the 
measure could be mapped to a different scale in the index, and the risk index would also be 
composed of multiple numbers. Whether a measure is composed of a single or multiple numbers, 
the new scale can be composed of continuous real numbers (a numerical index) or discrete 
categories or numbers (a categorical index). 
 
4.1. Numerical Index 
A continuous numerical scale is appropriate if the risk index is going to be used to 
compare different risks that are quite similar or to see how risk is changing over time because 
such a scale reveals subtle changes and differences. If decision makers are going to use the 
measurement or index as a basis for decisions, a numerical scale is preferable to a categorical 
scale because the numerical scale can provide greater detail and more levels of differentiation 
than a general category. 
A 100-point or 10-point scale is probably the most natural type of scale for a numerical 
index, as humankind has relied on a decimal numerical system for millennia. A linear 
transformation of the risk measure to a new scale requires identifying an upper bound and lower 
bound for the risk measure—    and    —which correspond to 0 and 100 on the 100-point 
scale. These bounds may not be true maximum and minimum values but may be arbitrarily 
chosen as the maximum acceptable level of risk,    , and the most desirable level of risk,    , 
which is similar to assessing high and low values for single-attribute value functions in decision 
problems.
(59)
 Eq. (7) demonstrates how the risk measure can be mapped to a 100-point risk index 
 ( ).  
 ( )  
 ( )     
       
     (7) 
Determining a value for    often presents a greater challenge than selecting   , which 
will usually equal 0. If the probability distribution underlying the risk measure is unbounded, the 
risk measure may not have any true maximum or upper bound. Instead, one could choose a value 
for     that represents the minimum value of risk that is considered unacceptable. Some 
governmental agencies have developed thresholds for individual fatality risks
(60)
 which can help 
guide the selection of   .  
Humans have a natural tendency to compare numbers using basic mathematical 
operations such as multiplication and addition. Consequently, a numerical risk index designed 
for public consumption may raise questions about whether the intervals between numbers on the 
index have any meaning. For example, a risk index evaluating safety risks in buildings for the 
city of London uses a 100-point scale,
(61)
 and the study’s authors warn its readers about 
misinterpreting the distance between numbers because the index is based on a logarithmic scale. 
Other papers use words such as “twice as risky” to compare risks with numerical measures or on 
a risk index.
(62,63,64)
 Risk priority numbers calculated using failure mode and effects analysis for 
several risks within an organization are sometimes added together to evaluate the overall risk for 
that organization even though adding risk priority numbers—which are based on ordinal scales—




 criticizes organizations that arbitrarily 
add and multiply risk scores together to calculate an overall risk measure or index without 
understanding whether scores should be added or multiplied. 
Because a numerical risk index could prompt people and organizations to add or multiply 
numbers in the index, understanding whether an index has certain mathematical properties (e.g., 
positive homogeneity, additivity, translation invariance) is a useful exercise. Financial risk 
measures are often evaluated based on whether these measures follow these and other axioms. In 
actuarial science, properties like positive homogeneity, translation invariance, and convexity 
explain the amount of capital required to cover a risk and encourage diversification in portfolios. 
Although these properties are less important for non-financial risk measures and indices, the 
tendency for people to add, subtract, and multiply numbers makes it desirable to investigate if a 
risk index has any of these properties. The users of the index should also be informed about the 
appropriateness of adding or multiplying numbers in the index and about the meaning, if any, of 
the numerical distance between values in the index.  
Whether an index number twice as large as another number on the index means that the 
former is twice as risky can be answered by exploring if the index is positive homogenous. An 
index with positive homogeneity means that if all the consequences worsen by a factor of    , 
the index number is multiplied by  , as Eq. (8) shows. 
 (  )    ( ) (8) 
Positive homogeneity implies that an event with an index value of 40 is twice as risky as an 
event with an index value of 20. If       and the risk measure is positive homogeneous, the 
numerical index obeys this property. The numerical consequences that underlie the risk measure 
should also be measured on a ratio scale with a meaningful zero value. 
An additive index implies that if two events are combined, the risk of these two events 
equals the sum of the risks of each event, as depicted in Eq. (9), where   and   are random 
variables representing two events. 
 (   )   ( )   ( ) (9) 
For the risk index to be additive,    must equal 0. The appealing feature of this property is that 
an organization can separately measure multiple risks and add the risks together to obtain a 
numerical measure of the organization’s risk. When an organization considers multiple risks, it is 
preferable to model the joint distribution of     rather than modeling each distribution 
separately and adding the summary risk measures or index numbers together. However, the joint 
modeling exercise could pose difficulties especially if more than two risks are being considered, 
and using an additive risk measure or index may be an appropriate substitute. 
 Finally, a translation invariant risk measure means that if consequences improve by some 
real number  , the riskiness of the event decreases by that same amount, as given in Eq. (10).  
 (   )   ( )    (10) 
A translation invariant risk measure means that the numerical difference between two measures 
can be interpreted using the units that measure the consequences. If the risk measure is 
translation invariant, mapping the measure to a 100-point scale as shown in Eq. (5) implies the 
relationship in Eq. (11). 
 ( )   (   )  
    
       
 (11) 
The risk index is translation invariant if            , which seems extremely unlikely as 
the risk index is usually based on a different scale than the consequences  . If the risk measure is 
translation invariant, the difference between two values on the risk index can still be used for 
comparisons among index values. For example, a difference of five between two scores means 
the same thing whether the scores are in the twenties or the eighties. 
 The mean value is the only risk measure considered that satisfies the positive 
homogenous, additive, and translation invariant properties. Value at risk, conditional value at 
risk, and the measure combining mean and standard deviation as in Eq. (1) are positive 
homogeneous and translation invariant
(36) 
but not additive. Standard deviation and the α-t model 
are positive homogeneous but neither translation invariant nor additive. Exponential disutility is 
additive if   and   are independent, and it is translation invariant but not positive homogeneous. 
(For any of these properties to hold for the two disutility models, the inverse function of the 
disutility model must be used.)  
 An analyst may determine that these properties are not important for the risk index 
because he or she does not foresee that the index will be interpreted in such a manner. In that 
case, whether or not the risk measure or index has any of these properties will not enter the 
decision on the type of measure to choose. However, if the analyst does believe the users will 
add or multiply numbers in the index, then these properties may influence the type of risk 
measure chosen. If separate risks are going to be combined into an overall risk measure, the 
additive property may be necessary, which limits the risk measures to expected values or 
expected exponential disutility. Some measures, such as conditional value at risk and standard 
deviation are subadditive, which means that  (   )   ( )   ( ). This property ensures 
that the summation of two risk measures provides an upper bound or a worst-case risk measure if 
the two risks are combined. If risks are going to be compared against each other, a positive 
homogeneous measure might be better because saying something like one risk is twice as risky 
as another event has a clear mathematical meaning. If the analyst believes that all three 
properties are crucial for the index or measure, using the mean as the measure might be the best 
choice. 
  
4.2. Categorical Index 
If the analyst is uncomfortable about communicating specific numbers or is worried that 
these numbers might give an inaccurate impression, he or she might want to transform the 
measure to a categorical rather than a numerical risk index. A categorical risk index is most 
appropriate when the goal is to give people a general sense of the level of risk. Especially if a 
large number of people are going to be using a risk index, using categories can facilitate broader 
communication because categories can be understood more easily than a numerical scale.  
A categorical risk index provides an ordering relationship among the categories, which 
can be composed of numbers, words, letters, or colors. Using words as categories like “severe” 
or “moderate” has an explicit communication purpose, and using letters implies a grading system 
in the United States. Another popular type of risk index is a color-coded chart. If a risk is 
classified in the “red” category, it sends a clear signal that the risk is very serious and may 
automatically trigger mitigating actions. If the risk measure is composed of multiple numbers, a 
single risk may fall into multiple categories, one for each number in the risk measure. This may 
create confusion because people may not understand why the same risk overlaps multiple 
categories. If people are carefully informed about the meanings of each categorization, however, 
a multiple categorization may allow each individual to rank risks based on what he or she 
believes is more important. For example, a single risk may be classified in a less severe category 
for risk neutral or moderately risk averse individuals but may be catalogued in a more severe 
category for very risk averse individuals. 
Regardless of the categorical scale chosen, the index should still rely on a careful analysis 
of the risks, and the level of a category should be based on a numerical risk measure. After 
determining the type of category, the analyst would choose the number of categories. Two 
objectives for determining how many categories are to minimize the number of categories and 
have enough categories to so that distinct risks are categorized differently. 
 The next step is to decide how to translate the numerical risk measure to a categorical 
scale. The simplest method is to divide the range of measures into equally divided intervals. 
Another method is to choose the categories based on the actual calculated risk measures. For 
example, 10 different events may have the following measures: 2.0, 2.5, 6.4, 7.0, 7.3, 9.2, 10.0, 
11.0, 13.0, and 13.5. The analyst may want to put the first two events in the same risk category, 
the next three events in another category, the next three events in one or possibly two categories, 
and the final two events in another category. This categorization method may have problems if 
new risks are later added to the index or if new information arrives that changes the calculations 
for the risk measures. 
Another method of creating categories is based on where a distinction between categories 
will most likely be noticed. Gustav Fechner, a German psychologist, postulated the intensity of a 
sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus increases, and several risk scales—including 
the Richter scale for earthquakes and the Torino scale for near-Earth objects like asteroids—use 
a logarithmic scale.
(67)









 One benefit of using a categorical scale is that recommended actions can be attached to 
each category. If the risk falls into a certain category, the public can be advised to take certain 
actions. For example, the National Weather Service issues tornado watches and warnings. Each 
advisory has a specific meaning and carries recommendations for people who receive a watch or 
a warning.
(69)
 Because these advisories have been used for a long time and are issued frequently 
in areas where tornadoes appear, people understand what these advisories mean. A person 
subconsciously attaches his or her own risk attitude to these advisories when deciding whether to 
follow the recommended actions.  
 
5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: TRANSPORTATION RISK 
An illustrative example comparing the risk of fatal accidents between aviation and highway 
demonstrates the construction and interpretation of risk measures and indices. Although this 
example will lead to conclusions about the riskiness of aviation versus highway, the most 
important insights from this example relate to what judgments need to be made about risk 
measures and whether and how to translate the measure to a risk index.  
Approximately 35,000 people die in transportation-related incidents in the United States 
each year, and the vast majority of fatalities result from accidents on the road.
(70)
 Whether 
driving or flying is safer depends on the assumptions used to calculate the probability of a fatal 
accident.
(71,72)
 Communicating the risk of fatalities of different transportation alternatives may 
help people make more informed choices, and policy makers are interested in reducing 
transportation-related fatalities.
(73,74,75,76)
 Risk measures and indices for aviation and highway 
risk can inform both the general public and policy makers.  
Consequences of a highway or aviation incident can include fatalities, injured persons, 
and the monetary cost of accidents. Because our interest is to demonstrate how consequences can 
be incorporated into a risk measure and index as opposed to generating a complete picture of 
transportation risk, the consequences in this example are composed solely of fatalities. Analyzing 
the risk of fatalities from transportation could serve different purposes: (1) to help public 
officials determine which mode carries more risk or (2) inform an individual about the riskiness 
of flying or driving. As will be discussed, each of these purposes may inform the type of risk 
measure selected.  
Aviation risk is divided into two categories based on U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations: 
air carriers or commercial aviation, and air taxi and commuters or on-demand and chartered 
flights. The data reveal a large difference in the risk of fatalities between these two categories of 
aviation. Most of the flying public use air carriers, and the risk of a fatal accident from an air 
carrier may be independent of the fatal risk from air taxis and commuters. The number of 
fatalities from each fatal accident in aviation and highway travel in the United States is recorded 
from 2005 through 2009 in Tables I – III. The data are derived from the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics,
(77,78,79,80)
 the National Transportation Safety Board,
(81)
 and the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
(82) 
  
Table I. Fatalities from air carrier incidents in the U.S., 2005-2009. 







 air carrier miles traveled, 2005-2009 
 
Table II. Fatalities from air taxi and commuter incidents in the U.S., 2005-2009. 












 air taxi and commuter miles traveled, 2005-2009 
 
Table III. Fatalities from highway incidents in the U.S., 2005-2009. 

















 highway miles traveled, 2005-2009 
 
 We use the data to develop probability distributions for each of the three transportation 
modes. Normalizing the number of incidents, we assume that the number of fatalities given that 
at least one fatality occurs follows a “shifted” geometric distribution:  ( )    (   )    
where           is the number of fatalities;     ̅⁄   and  ̅ is the average number of 
fatalities given a fatal incident occurs. From the data in the tables,  ̅       for air carriers, 2.9 
for air taxi and commuters, and 1.1 for highway, which translate to                and       
for the three transportation modes, respectively. Figure 2 depicts the cumulative probability 
distributions and the empirical probabilities from Tables I – III. The shifted geometric 
distribution provides a good fit for air taxi and commuter and highway, but the theoretical 
distribution for air carrier underestimates the probability of an incident with 1 fatality. Because 
the probability distribution for air carrier is based on only four data points, this distribution could 
change significantly if just one or two additional fatal accidents occurred. 
 
Fig. 2. Cumulative probability distributions for number of fatalities given a fatal accident occurs. 
 
 Because the distributions are calculated given a fatal incident occurs, we calculate the 
probability of fatal incident by dividing the total number of fatal incidents by the total number of 
miles traveled in the United States. The probabilities of a fatal incident per 1 million miles 
traveled are calculated as 0.000175 for air carriers, 0.229 for air taxis and commuters, and 0.0121 
for highway. The probability distribution of fatalities for a mode of transportation is the 
probability of a fatal incident multiplied by the shifted geometric distribution. We also rotate the 
distribution over the vertical axis so that fatalities are represented by negative numbers to 
correspond with how consequences were defined in Section 3.  
 The different formulas discussed in Section 3 are used to measure the risk of fatalities for 
the three different transportation modes using these probability distributions of fatalities. Table 
IV depicts the mean, standard deviation, value at risk for two different quantiles, and conditional 
value at risk.
1
 Figure 3 displays risk measures using Eq. (1), which combines the mean and 
standard deviation into a single risk measure, for different values of  . Figures 4 and 5 plot risk 
measures for exponential disutility and the α-t model (where    ) for different risk attitudes. 
The risk measure for the exponential disutility function and the α-t model are transformed by 
taking the inverse of disutility functions so that the measure is in units of fatalities. If    , 
raising  ( ) to the power   ⁄  results in an extremely small number. Consequently, the risk 
measure for the α-t model is not in units of fatalities for a risk seeking attitude. 





Value at risk Conditional value at risk 
                             
Air carrier 0.0031 0.32 0 0 0.061 0.31 
Air taxi and 
commuter 
0.67 1.67 4 8 6.48 10.31 
Highway 0.013 0.13 0 1 0.27 1.12 
 
                                                 
1
 Different calculations exist for conditional value at risk for discrete distributions. We use the expected shortfall 
definition given in Acerbi and Tasche
(35)
 where       
 
 
( [       ]      ( [     ]   )). 
 
Fig. 3. Risk measure as a weighted sum between the mean and standard deviation as given in Eq. (1). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Risk measure using an exponential disutility function. 
 
Fig. 5. Risk measure using the α-t model where    . 
 
Air taxi and commuter carries the largest risk of fatalities according to almost all of the 
risk measures under consideration. If the mean (or a risk neutral attitude) is used as a risk 
measure, highway transportation carries more risk than air carrier transportation. The mean 
number of deaths per 1 million miles traveled on the highway is 3.5 times greater than the mean 
number of deaths for air carrier transportation. Value at risk and conditional value at risk, both of 
which attempt to measure extreme values in the tails of the probability distributions, also 
produce risk measures in which highway carries more risk than air carriers. Because the 
probability of 4 or more fatalities is greater for air carriers than for highway, the former mode of 
transportation has a larger standard deviation and consequently, more variability. The standard 
deviations for both modes of transportation are much larger than their respective means, and 
putting a small amount of weight (     ) on the standard deviation in the measure in Eq. (1) 
produces a risk measure where air carrier transportation is riskier than highway (Figure 3). 
The risk of fatalities from highway transportation exceeds that from air carrier travel for 
moderately risk averse attitudes in the disutility functions (Figures 4 and 5), but as risk aversion 
increases, air carriers become riskier than highway. If         in the exponential disutility or 
if        in the α-t model, air carrier risk exceeds highway risk. The disutility risk measures 
for air carrier transportation are also larger than that for air taxi and commuters for very risk 
averse attitudes:         in the exponential disutility or        in the α-t model. The 
probability of a fatal incident for air carriers is less than the probability for both air taxis and 
commuters or highway, but the probability of a large number of fatalities given a fatal accident 
occurs for air carriers is greater than the other transportation modes.  The larger values for   and 
  emphasize crashes with scores of fatalities, which have occurred with air carriers. 
Whether a user interested in transportation fatalities would exhibit risk aversion depends 
on the goal of the risk measure and the user’s preferences. If the goal is to help inform policy 
makers about reducing transportation fatalities, any risk attitude may be justified. Debate exists 
within the decision and risk analysis literature over the appropriate risk attitude for fatalities in a 
public policy context.
(83,84,85)
 Many risk assessments of potential fatalities assume moderate risk 
aversion.
(86,87,88)
 People tend to prefer a situation with a large probability of a small number of 
fatalities to one with a smaller probability of a larger number of fatalities even if the expected 
number of fatalities is identical in both situations.
(89,90)
 However, Slovic et al.
(84)
 question the risk 
aversion assumption due to an experiment in which people chose to reduce the number of single-
fatality incidents rather than reduce the probability of a catastrophic incident with a large number 
of fatalities. Another study
(91)
 reveals that people may exhibit both risk seeking and risk averse 
attitudes, depending on how the situation is framed. Because incidents with a large number of 
fatalities receive more media and public attention, a policy maker may want to focus on 
minimizing the number of accidents with many fatalities.  
 The risk measure may also be used to inform an individual whether he or she is more 
likely to die traveling in an airplane or in a motor vehicle, which suggests that the probability of 
a fatal incident is the best measure. The probability of a fatal incident per one million miles is 
0.00018 for air carriers, 0.23 for air taxis and commuters, and 0.012 for highway transportation. 
Ceteris paribus, an individual should travel with air carriers to minimize his or her chances of 
being killed while traveling. 
Translating the above risk measures to a different numerical scale may help with 
communication and give people a more intuitive sense of risk. A 100-point numerical scale is 
created where a value of 0 on the scale is equivalent to no fatalities (     ) and a value of 100 
is equivalent to exactly one fatality per one million miles (     ). Table V depicts risk 
indices using this scale for the measures based on the mean values, probabilities of a fatal 
incident, exponential disutility where       , and α-t model where       . (Decimals are 
rounded to the nearest integer for these four indices.) The logarithmic index in the last column of 
Table V uses a different transformation and will be analyzed shortly. 
 
Table V. Transportation risk index 










        
α-t model 
       
Air carrier 0 0 2 2 7.5 
Air taxi and commuter 67 23 74 96 9.8 
Highway 1 1 1 3 8.1 
 
The severity of the risk as communicated by the index differs according to the risk 
measure. The index value of 96 based on the risk averse α-t model makes air taxi and commuter 
risk appear extremely severe, but the index value of 23 based on the probability of a fatal 
incident makes the risk appear much more acceptable. This example illustrates how the type of 
risk measure selected heavily influences the riskiness of an event as determined and 
communicated by an index. When compared with air taxi and commuter, the indices for air 
carrier and highway are much less severe.  
The logarithmic index is the most unique index depicted in Table V. This index is 
calculated by adding 10 to the base-10 logarithm of the expected number of fatalities. Thus, one 
fatality per one million miles corresponds to an index value of 10, and 10
-10
 expected fatalities 
corresponds to 0. (If 10
-10
 expected fatalities is too small to serve as an effective lower bound for 
the index, the base of the logarithm can be changed to reflect a different lower bound.) Taking 
the logarithm of the expected values as opposed to linear scaling—as in the other indices—
compresses the differences between the expected number of fatalities. The risks of fatalities from 
each of the three modes of transportation appear more similar with a logarithmic index, and this 




 The majority of risk indices and risk measures demonstrate that air carrier transportation 
is the least risky with respect to fatalities and that air taxis and commuters carry the most risk. As 
risk aversion increases, air carrier transportation carries a greater risk than highway 
transportation and even becomes riskier than air taxis and commuters. The risk averse disutility 
functions emphasize incidents with a large number fatalities, which is more probable with air 
carrier transportation.  
These conclusions about the riskiness of each mode of transportation depend on the 
probability of fatalities for each mode. Because the probability of a fatal incident for air carrier 
transportation is so small (0.000175), only seven fatal incidents for air carriers occurred between 
2005 and 2009. If more fatal incidents occur, the probability distribution given a fatal incident in 
air carrier transportation would change, but the risk measure or risk index may not be much 
different as long as the probability of a fatal incident remains small. Epistemic uncertainty may 
also exist which may require more sophisticated modeling. For example, the likelihood of fatal 
incidents increases in severe weather, which changes the risk for all three modes and potentially 
the ordering of these risks. If the goal of the analysis and risk index is to inform actions during 
severe weather, the probabilities should perhaps be assessed using data under severe weather 
conditions, by conducting a probabilistic analysis of possible initiating events leading to fatal 
incidents, and/or through simulation techniques.  
Analysts and decision makers could (and should!) make identical conclusions about the 
riskiness of each transportation mode by studying the fatality data in Tables I – III, and the most 
complete way to incorporate risk into a decision is to examine probability distributions. 
However, many people are not comfortable with probability distributions and prefer a single 
numerical risk measure or a categorization of risk rather than studying a table of raw data. This 
example demonstrates how the guidelines in Sections 2 and 3 can be applied to translate raw data 
to a summary risk measure and index. If the analyst needs to summarize the data or probability 
distribution, his or her choices about the type of measure (e.g., mean, standard deviation, 
quantile, disutility functions) and parameters, such as the risk averse parameter in disutility 
functions or the value of    , can impact how risky an event is and the ranking of different 
risks. If a decision maker wants a single numerical measure describing the risk of transportation 
fatalities or if the government wants to communicate this risk to the public with a 100-point scale 
risk index, exploring the issues with these summary measures and how choices of an index can 
change the interpretation and ranking of risks should be part of the process.  
The index should be selected based on which index best meets the goal of the risk 
assessment. If the goal is to inform the public about the risk of each mode of transportation, the 
risk index based on the mean or probability of a fatal incident or the logarithmic index may be 
most appropriate. An index based on either of the disutility functions or on conditional value at 
risk may best communicate how risk is changing over time to a policy maker that wants to 
emphasize incidents with a large number of fatalities. One of the risk measures from Table IV 
(maybe the mean or a measure composed of two or three values) can help a decision maker 
identify if more safety measures are needed for one of the transportation modes; however, that 




This paper has outlined steps to create a risk index with the goal of unifying the 
construction of risk indices and in order to correct flawed methods such as those resulting in risk 
matrices. Several issues have been raised for analysts and decision makers to consider when 
thinking about the type of risk index to use. A risk index should be based on a numerical analysis 
of the risk using probabilities and consequences that is summarized by a risk measure. Risk 
measures can generally be classified into one of four categories: moments, quantiles, disutility 
functions, and weighted indicators or factors. Risk measures can also be composed of two or 
three values, and decision makers who want to rely on risk measures should consider a measure 
composed of multiple numbers. As demonstrated by the transportation example, the choice of 
risk measure can impact the riskiness of an event and the ordering of multiple risks. 
Once the risk measure has been calculated, the analyst can map that measure to a 
numerical or categorical index, or the measure itself can serve as a risk index. Recall the list of 
objectives for risk indices outlined in the introduction. The most important goals for a situation 
should determine the type and structure of the risk index. If the most important goal is to 
describe the risk of an event in the most accurate way possible, the analyst should use the 
probability distribution or rely on a measure with multiple numbers. If a single number is 
desired, using a disutility function that incorporates the decision maker’s preferences to the 
greatest possible extent is best. A numerical measure is also most appropriate when the goal is to 
assess how a mitigating action impacts the risk. The measure can provide a metric to judge the 
effectiveness of different mitigation strategies if it is known how these mitigation strategies 
impact the probability distribution. In this case, the risk is first measured under the assumption of 
no mitigation strategy and then assessed assuming the mitigation strategy was enacted. The 
difference between the two measures describes the benefit of the mitigation strategy. 
A numerical risk index can best achieve the objectives of comparing between different 
risks, determining the most serious risk, and understanding how a risk changes over time. A 
numerical risk index can enable a user to clearly see which risk is most serious and how close the 
risk is to the maximum level of risk, although determining the upper bound for risk can pose 
serious challenges.  
A categorical scale can be most useful when the primary goal is to communicate risk to a 
large group of people and recommend actions if the risk falls into a certain category. Simple and 
clear messages can be most effective, especially in moments of crises, and a categorical scale 
that uses colors or words may be the clearest communication tool. If more than one goal is 
important as is usually the case, the analyst or policy maker should choose the index that best 
meets those goals and the situation.  
The audience must also be considered when choosing the type of risk measure or index. 
If the audience is limited to a group of people who understand probability distributions, the 
analyst may forgo a risk measure and present the group with a probability distribution over the 
consequences. If the audience is composed of people who regularly work with numbers but who 
do not have the expertise or the time to work with probability distributions, a risk measure 
composed of multiple numbers may be the most appropriate. If the audience is an entire nation, a 
categorical index that is simple but informative may be ideal.  
In all of these cases, an explanation should accompany the risk index. The analyst needs 
to explain what the number or category means, what it means if the risk increases or decreases, 
what it means if two risks have different risk numbers or are categorized differently, and the 
limitations of the risk index or measure. It takes time for people to trust and learn how to react to 
a new risk index. If the categories are specific and people understand why a risk is categorized at 
a given level, the index can provide useful information about the risk of an event to the users. 
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